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Abstract
In this paper, we consider methods whereby a subset of players in a (k, n)-threshold
scheme can “repair” another player’s share in the event that their share has been lost or
corrupted. This will take place without the participation of the dealer who set up the
scheme. The repairing protocol should not compromise the (unconditional) security of
the threshold scheme, and it should be efficient, where efficiency is measured in terms
of the amount of information exchanged during the repairing process. We study two
approaches to repairing. The first method is based on the “enrollment protocol” from [9]
which was originally developed to add a new player to a threshold scheme (without the
participation of the dealer) after the scheme was set up. The second method distributes
“multiple shares” to each player, as defined by a suitable combinatorial design. This
method results in larger shares, but lower communication complexity, as compared to
the first method.
1 Introduction
Suppose that k1, k2 and n are positive integers such that k1 < k2 ≤ n. Informally, a
(k1, k2, n)-ramp scheme is a method whereby a dealer chooses a secret and distributes a
share to each of n players such that the following two properties are satisfied:
reconstruction Any subset of k2 players can compute the secret from the shares that they
collectively hold, and
secrecy No subset of k1 players can determine any information about the secret.
We call k1 and k2 the lower threshold and upper threshold of the scheme, respectively. When
k2 = k1 + 1 = k, a ramp scheme is known as a (k, n)-threshold scheme.
In this paper, we are only interested in schemes that are unconditionally secure. That
is, all security results are valid against adversaries with unlimited computational power.
∗The authors’ research is supported by NSERC discovery grants.
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The original motivation for ramp schemes (as opposed to threshold schemes) is that
ramp schemes permit larger secrets be shared for a given share size. The efficiency of secret
sharing is often measured in terms of the information rate of the scheme, which is defined
to be the ratio ρ = log2 |K|/ log2 |S| (where S is the set of all possible shares and K is the
set of all possible secrets). That is, the information rate is the ratio of the size of the secret
to the size of a share.
For a threshold scheme, a fundamental result states that ρ ≤ 1. However, there are
constructions for ramp schemes where the (optimal) information rate is k2 − k1; for non-
threshold ramp schemes, this quantity exceeds one.
We briefly describe a standard construction for ramp schemes with optimal information
rate (see, e.g., [11]). In the threshold case, this is just the classical Shamir threshold scheme
[12]. The construction takes place over a finite field FQ, where Q ≥ n+ 1.
1. In the Initialization Phase, the dealer, denoted by D, chooses n distinct, non-zero
elements of FQ, denoted xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The values xi are public. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D
gives the value xi to Pi.
2. Let λ = k2 − k1. In the Share Distribution phase, D chooses a secret
K = (a0, . . . , aλ−1) ∈ (FQ)λ.
ThenD secretly chooses (independently and uniformly at random) aλ, . . . , ak2−1 ∈ FQ.
Next, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D computes yi = a(xi), where
a(x) =
k2−1∑
j=0
aj x
j .
Finally, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D constructs the share yi = a(xi) and gives it to Pi.
Reconstruction is easily accomplished using the Lagrange interpolation formula (see,
e.g., [14, §13.1]).
1.1 Share Repairability
The problem of share repairability has been considered by several authors in recent years
(see, for example, [8]). We will mainly consider repairability of threshold schemes. The
problem setting is that a certain player Pℓ (in a (k, n)-threshold scheme, say) loses their
share. The goal is to find a “secure” protocol involving Pℓ and a subset of the other players
that allows the missing share yℓ to be reconstructed. (Of course the dealer could simply re-
send the share to Pℓ, but we are considering a setting where the dealer is no longer present
in the scheme after the initial setup.) In general, we will assume secure pairwise channels
linking pairs of players.
We consider protocols that operate in two phases:
1. In the message exchange phase, a certain subset of d players (not including Pℓ)
exchange messages among themselves. The integer d is called the repairing degree.
We will only consider protocols where each player sends at most one message to any
other player, and every message is sent at the same time.
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2. In the repairing phase, these same d players each send a message to Pℓ. The
messages received by Pℓ allow Pℓ’s share to be reconstructed. Some of the protocols
we study only require a repairing phase.
We note that d ≥ k is an obvious necessary condition for the existence of such a scheme.
This is seen as follows. Suppose k − 1 players could repair another player’s share. Then
these k−1 players would have k shares, which would enable them to reconstruct the secret.
This is of course not allowed in a (k, n)-threshold scheme.
We have to consider what it means for a protocol of this type to be “secure”. Our
definition of security is motivated by the required threshold property. In general, we will
consider a coalition of k− 1 players. This coalition may or may not include Pℓ. We assume
that all players execute the protocol correctly, but the coalition is trying to obtain some
information about the secret. (Thus we are assuming that the coalition is “honest-but-
curious”.) After executing the protocol, the coalition combines all the information it holds.
This includes their shares, as well as all messages that they send or receive during the
protocol. All of this information should still yield no information about the secret. If a
(k, n)-threshold scheme has a repairability protocol that satisfies this security requirement,
then we say that it is a (k, n, d)-repairable threshold scheme, which we abbreviate to (k, n, d)-
RTS.
We distinguish between two types of repairability in this paper. We will say that an
(n, k, d)-RTS has universal repairability if any subset of d players can repair a share of any
other player. Most previous discussions of repairability in the literature have implicitly or
explicitly considered this model. A weaker condition would be to require only that there
exists a subset of d players who will be able to repair a given share belonging to some other
player. We will call this restricted repairability.
One potential advantage of considering restricted repairability is that it can lead to more
efficient schemes, where efficiency is measured in terms of information rate (of the threshold
scheme) and/or communication complexity (of the repairing process). This is one of the
themes we explore in this paper.
1.2 Our Contributions
We present two repairability schemes in this paper. The first scheme is a modification of an
enrollment protocol due to Nojoumian et al. described in [9, 10]. In this scheme, any k users
are able to repair a share of another user, and the scheme provides universal repairability.
Thus it is a (k, n, k)-RTS. The underlying threshold scheme is just the Shamir secret sharing
scheme, which is an ideal scheme (i.e., the information rate is equal to 1).
The second scheme provides restricted repairability. It combines two schemes and can
lead to a solution with higher information rate and lower communication complexity (so it
trades off larger share sizes for less information communicated during repairing). It uses
a distribution design having certain properties to allocate subsets of shares of a Shamir
scheme (or a ramp scheme) to each user. We look at various types of combinatorial designs
that yield good solutions for repairability when used in this way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the enrollment
protocol, modified to provide repairability. In Section 3, we give a brief overview of the
Guang-Lu-Fu Scheme [8]. Section 4 presents our second scheme, which has a somewhat
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similar flavour. Then, in Section 5, we examine various types of distribution designs and
the repairable threshold schemes that can be obtained form them. In Section 6. we compare
our construction to the GLF scheme from [8]. Section 7 addresses the problem of universal
repairability in the combinatorial setting. Finally, Section 8 is a brief conclusion.
2 NSG Enrollment Protocol
The enrollment protocol from [10, 9] was introduced to create a share for a new player in a
threshold scheme, without requiring the participation of the dealer who initially set up the
scheme. It was also described in a setting where threshold of the scheme was to be altered.
Here, we discuss a straightforward modification where the protocol is used to repair a share,
without changing the threshold. This protocol has repairing degree k and achieves universal
repairability.
Suppose we have a (k, n)-Shamir threshold scheme defined over FQ, and we wish to
repair the share for a player Pℓ. We assume that this share is being repaired by players
P1, . . . , Pk and ℓ > k. Suppose the share for Pℓ is ϕℓ = f(ℓ), where f(x) ∈ FQ[x] is a
random polynomial of degree at most k − 1 whose constant term is the secret. The share
ϕℓ can be expressed as
ϕℓ =
k∑
i=1
γiϕi, (1)
where the γi’s are public Lagrange coefficients (see, e.g., [14, §13.1]). In what follows, all
arithmetic is performed in FQ.
The enrollment protocol proceeds as follows:
1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, player Pi computes random values δj,i for 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
γiϕi =
k∑
j=1
δj,i. (2)
2. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, player Pi transmits δj,i to player Pj using a secure
channel.
3. For all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, player Pj computes
σj =
k∑
i=1
δj,i. (3)
4. For all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, player Pj transmits σj to player Pℓ using a secure channel.
5. Player Pℓ computes their share ϕℓ using the formula
ϕℓ =
k∑
j=1
σj . (4)
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It is straightforward to verify that player Pℓ computes their share correctly, i.e., the
value of ϕℓ computed using (2), (3) and (4) is the same as (1).
Let us consider the security of this protocol. We assume that all players act honestly
during the protocol and do not reveal any information while the protocol is being executed.
Later, however, it may be the case that a coalition C of k − 1 participants attempts to
compute some information about the secret. We will show that this is impossible. Note
that we are basically describing the security proof from [10, §2.4.2c] with a few additional
details added.
First, we note that computing the secret, given k− 1 shares, is equivalent to computing
any additional share. This is easy to see, because any k shares allow the secret to be
computed, and any k−1 shares along with the secret allow any other share to be computed
(this is a well-known property of the Shamir scheme).
There are two cases to consider:
case (i) The coalition C consists of a subset of k − 1 players in {P1, . . . , Pk}.
case (ii) The coalition C consists of Pℓ along with a subset of k−2 players in {P1, . . . , Pk}.
It is convenient to consider the following share-exchange matrix defined in [10]:
E =


δ1,1 δ2,1 · · · δk,1
δ1,2 δ2,2 · · · δk,2
...
...
. . .
...
δ1,k δ2,k · · · δk,k.

 .
Observe from (2) that the sum of the entries in the ith row of E is equal to γiϕi. Also, from
(3), the sum of the entries in the jth column of E is equal to σj, so Pℓ knows all k column
sums. Finally, it is immediate from (2), (3) and (4) that the sum of all the entries in E is
equal to ϕℓ.
In case (i), we can assume without loss of generality that C = {P1, . . . , Pk−1}. Here
the coalition C possesses all the entries in E except for δk,k. But this value is completely
random, and knowing this value is equivalent to knowing the value of ϕk, ϕℓ or the secret.
We conclude that C has no information about the secret in this case.
Case (ii) is a bit more complicated. Here, we can assume without loss of generality
that C = {P1, . . . , Pk−2, Pℓ}. The coalition C possesses all the entries in E except for the
four entries δk−1,k−1, δk−1,k, δk,k−1 and δk,k. Further, since Pℓ knows the column sums, the
equations
σk−1 = δk−1,k−1 + δk−1,k (5)
and
σk = δk,k−1 + δk,k (6)
are known. So we have two linear equations in four unknowns.
Of course Pℓ also knows the value of the share ϕℓ, and ϕℓ is a known linear combination
of the k shares ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, as given by (1). But only the first k−2 of these shares are known
to C.
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It is possible to choose arbitrary values for δk−1,k−1 and δk,k−1. Thus
ϕk−1 =
δk−1,k−1 + δk,k−1
γk−1
can take on any arbitrary value. Then the values of δk−1,k and δk,k (and hence ϕk) will be
determined by (5) and (6).
Similarly, we could choose an arbitrary value for ϕk and then ϕk−1 would be determined.
In either case, the coalition knows the values of k− 1 shares, but they have no information
about the individual shares ϕk−1 and ϕk. Since this represents all the information available
to C, we conclude that C also has no information about the secret in case (ii).
2.1 Communication Complexity of the Enrollment Protocol
The communication complexity of a share repairing scheme is the sum of the sizes (i.e., the
bit-lengths) of all the messages transmitted during the protocol divided by the bit-length
of the secret. In the enrollment protocol, every message is an element of FQ, as is the
secret. Therefore, the communication complexity is equal to the total number of messages
transmitted. It is computed as follows:
• k(k − 1) in step 2,
• k in step 4, and
• therefore the total is k2.
2.2 Ramp Scheme Repairability
The same protocol works in the case of a ramp scheme. Here we need k2 players to re-
construct a lost secret. The same Lagrange formula applies in this situation, since a share
is just an evaluation of the polynomial at a particular point. The security proof needs to
be modified to consider security against coalitions of k1 players. As was the situation in
analyzing the threshold scheme, there are two cases to consider:
case (i) The coalition C consists of a subset of k1 players in {P1, . . . , Pk2}.
case (ii) The coalition C consists of Pℓ along with a subset of k1−1 players in {P1, . . . , Pk2}.
We briefly outline the proof in the two cases.
In case (i), we can assume without loss of generality that C = {P1, . . . , Pk1}. The
coalition C possesses all the entries in the share-exchange matrix E except for the λ by λ
lower right submatrix of E (where λ = k2 − k1). The entries of this submatrix can be filled
in such that they are consistent with any possible values of the λ shares ϕk1+1, . . . , ϕk2 .
Therefore, the secret is completely undetermined.
In case (ii), we assume that C = {P1, . . . , Pk1−1, Pℓ}. Then C possesses all the entries in
E except for the λ+1 by λ+1 lower right submatrix of E . The coalition also knows the value
of ϕℓ as well as the column sums σk1 , . . . , σk2 . Any λ rows of this submatrix can be filled in
with arbitrary values, which means that the λ corresponding shares can take on arbitrary
values. The values in the remaining row of the submatrix are then determined by the known
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column sums, which means that the share corresponding to this row is determined. So the
information available to the coalition consists of k2 known shares, and it is consistent with
any possible values of any λ additional shares. So the coalition has no information about
the secret.
In conclusion, we have shown that C has no information about the secret in either of
the two cases.
3 Guang-Lu-Fu (GLF) Scheme
The GLF scheme, described in [8], has a lower information rate than the enrollment scheme,
but also lower communication complexity. As such, it achieves a tradeoff between these two
measures. The GLF scheme provides universal repairability and it is based on linearized
polynomials and minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) codes [6]. We do not discuss
the scheme in detail, but we will refer to its basic properties where it is relevant to do so.
We recall one example from [8] to illustrate the basic idea. Example 2 from [8] is a
(2, 4)-threshold scheme with information rate 1/3. The secret is an element over FQ and
each share is a triple over FQ. The repairing degree d = 3. Repairing a player works as
follows. Each of three players send one message to the fourth player, where a message is an
element of FQ. The three messages received enable the three components of the share to be
reconstructed. For this scheme, we would say that the total communication complexity is
3. This is an improvement over the communication complexity (which is equal to 4) using
the enrollment scheme for a (2, 4)-threshold scheme.
4 A New Technique for Combinatorial Repairability
In this section, we present a (k, n)-threshold scheme with low information rate and commu-
nication complexity that achieves restricted repairability. We base our construction on an
old technique, namely giving each player a subset of shares from an underlying threshold
scheme1. We will start with an (ℓ,m)-threshold scheme, say a Shamir scheme, implemented
over a finite field FQ. This is called the base scheme. We then give each player a certain
subset of d of the m shares. A design consisting of n blocks of size d, defined on a set of m
points, will be used to do this. This design is termed the distribution design. The repairing
degree will be equal to d.
We will call the shares of the base (ℓ,m)-threshold scheme subshares. Each share in
the resulting (k, n)-threshold scheme consists of d subshares. We need to ensure that the
threshold property is satisfied for the resulting (k, n)-threshold scheme, which we call the
expanded scheme. We also need to be able to repair the share of any player in the expanded
scheme by judiciously choosing a certain set of other players, who will then send appropriate
subshares to the player whose share is being repaired.
Let the blocks in the distribution design be denoted B1, . . . , Bn and let X denote the
set of m points. The threshold property will be satisfied in the expanded scheme provided
that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1This technique has most commonly been considered in the past in connection with the construction of
secret sharing schemes for non-threshold access structures; see, e.g., [3, Theorem 1].
7
1. the union of any k blocks contains at least ℓ points, and
2. the union of any k − 1 blocks contains at most ℓ− 1 points.
We are considering a repairing scheme where certain designated players transmit sub-
shares to the player whose share is being repaired. This technique can be applied provided
that every point in the distribution design occurs in at least two blocks (this is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for this kind of repairability to be possible). Therefore, if this
property is satisfied, we say that the distribution design is repairable.
Suppose we want to repair the share corresponding to a block B. For each point x ∈ B,
we can find another block that contains x (because the distribution design is repairable).
The corresponding player can send the subshare corresponding to x to the player whose
node is being repaired. The communication complexity of the expanded scheme will be
equal to d, since d elements of FQ are transmitted to repair a share of a secret in FQ.
It is not a requirement that the d subshares are obtained from d different blocks. For
example, it could happen that d = 3, one block contributes two subshares, and one block
contributes one subshare during the repairing process. However, we will frequently be
considering schemes where we have d blocks, each of which contributes one subshare. This
is analogous to the model from [8], where it is assumed that each player contributes a
constant number β of “elements” to the player whose share is begin repaired (where an
“element” is a subshare or a certain linear combination of subshares).
It is quite simple to analyze the security of combinatorial repairability. The main point to
observe is that the information collectively held by any subset of players (after the repairing
protocol is completed) consists only of their shares in the expanded scheme. They did not
obtain any information collectively that they did not already possess before the execution
of the repairing protocol. So it is immediate that a set k − 1 players cannot compute the
secret after the repairing of a share occurs.
4.1 Using Ramp Schemes as Base Schemes
We have one additional useful modification to describe. Suppose that the distribution design
satisfies the following two properties.
1. the union of any k blocks contains at least ℓ2 points, and
2. the union of any k − 1 blocks contains at most ℓ1 points,
where ℓ2− ℓ1 ≥ 1. In this case we say that the distribution design is a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution
design. See Table 1 for a summary of the parameters and required properties of a distribu-
tion design.
Given a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design, we let the base scheme be an (ℓ1, ℓ2,m)-ramp
scheme2 defined over FQ (this can be done if Q ≥ m + 1). Then we use the distribution
design to distribute shares to the n players. This yields a (k, n)-threshold scheme (the
expanded scheme) having information rate (ℓ2 − ℓ1)/d.
2Note that, if ℓ2 − ℓ1 = 1, then the ramp scheme is a threshold scheme, and we have the construction
described in the previous section.
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Table 1: Parameters and properties of a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design
m number of points in the design
n number of blocks in the design (= the number of players)
d block size (= the repairing degree)
k threshold
ℓ1 maximum number of points in the union of k − 1 blocks
ℓ2 minimum number of points in the union of k blocks
Repairing works exactly as before, and d subshares, each of which is an element of FQ,
are transmitted to repair a share. However, the secret is now an element in (FQ)
ℓ2−ℓ1 , so
the communication complexity is now d/(ℓ2 − ℓ1). (Note that this is just the reciprocal of
the information rate of the expanded scheme.)
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists a repairable (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design on m points,
having n blocks of size d, and suppose that Q ≥ m+ 1. Then there is a (k, n, d)-RTS with
restricted repairability, having information rate (ℓ2 − ℓ1)/d and communication complexity
d/(ℓ2 − ℓ1), where every share is in (FQ)d.
Suppose we have a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design on n blocks in which every point occurs
in at least two blocks, as required in Theorem 4.1. If we take an arbitrary subset of the
blocks of such a design, then it may not be the case that every point occurs in at least two
blocks of the “smaller” design. It would be convenient to have a simple method of selecting
subsets of blocks of a design in such a way that this property continues to be satisfied.
Here is the approach we will use to achieve this objective. We say that a subset of s
blocks in a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design on n blocks is a basic repairing set of size s if every
point in the design is contained in at least two blocks in the basic repairing set. It is obvious
that any superset of a basic repairing set is repairable. So we have the following result.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose there exists a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution design on m points, having b
blocks of size d, and suppose that Q ≥ m + 1. Suppose that this design contains a basic
repairing set of size s. Then, for any n such that s ≤ n ≤ b, there is a (k, n, d)-RTS with
restricted repairability, having information rate (ℓ2 − ℓ1)/d and communication complexity
d/(ℓ2 − ℓ1), where every share is an element of (FQ)d.
5 Some Distribution Designs and the Resulting RTS
In this section, we provide some examples of distribution designs and describe how they
can be used to construct repairable secret sharing schemes. The designs we use are Steiner
triple systems, resolvable (m,d, 1)-BIBDs and projective planes.
5.1 Steiner Triple Systems
We first consider using a Steiner triple system as a distribution design. This only allows
certain thresholds, but the number of players can take on a large range of values. A Steiner
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triple system of order m (or, STS(m)) has m points and b = m(m− 1)/6 blocks of size 3,
and every pair of points occurs in exactly one block. An STS(m) can also be defined as
an (m, 3, 1)-BIBD (balanced incomplete block design). For a comprehensive reference on
Steiner triple systems, see [5].
Using the blocks of an STS(m) as a distribution design would yield repairing degree
d = 3. The simplest application would be to take k = 2. The union of any two blocks in the
design contains at least five points, and each block contains three points. Hence we can take
ℓ1 = 3, ℓ2 = 5 and use a (3, 5,m)-ramp scheme as the base scheme. The expanded scheme
will be a (2, n, 3)-RTS having information rate 2/3 and communication complexity is 3/2.
This is certainly an improved communication complexity as compared to the enrollment
protocol with threshold k = 2, which has communication complexity 4.
We still need to determine the permissible values of n in the above construction. It will
be advantageous to make use of resolvable STS(m). An STS(m) is resolvable if the set of
b = m(m − 1)/6 blocks can be partitioned into b = (m − 1)/2 parallel classes, where each
parallel class consists of m/3 disjoint blocks. It is well-known that a resolvable STS(m)
exists if and only if m ≡ 3 (mod 6).
Suppose we use a resolvable STS(m) as our distribution design. Then two parallel classes
in this design comprise a basic repairing set of size 2m/3. As a result, we can accommodate
any number n of players such that 2m/3 ≤ n ≤ m(m− 1)/6. We have proved the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose m ≡ 3 (mod 6), Q is a prime power such that Q ≥ m + 1 and
2m/3 ≤ n ≤ m(m − 1)/6. Then there exists a (2, n, 3)-RTS with restricted repairability,
with shares from (FQ)
3, having information rate 2/3 and communication complexity 3/2.
Example 5.1. The smallest interesting application of Theorem 5.1 is when m = 9. The
distribution design is a resolvable STS(9), consisting of four parallel classes of three blocks.
We take two parallel classes to form the basic repairing sent, along with an arbitrary subset
of the remaining six blocks. In this way, we can construct a (2, n, 3)-RTS for any n such
that 6 ≤ n ≤ 12. The scheme has information rate 2/3 and communication complexity
3/2. Subshares are elements of FQ, where Q ≥ 11 is any prime power, and the secret is an
element of (FQ)
2. Shares consist of three elements of FQ.
5.1.1 Quadrilateral-free STS
What if we use an STS to try to construct a scheme with a higher threshold? The union of
two blocks contains at most six points (and equality is achieved if the two blocks are disjoint).
However, it is easy to find sets of three blocks whose union contains six points (e.g., three
blocks of the form xyz, xuv, uyw). Even four blocks might have a union consisting of six
points: xyz, xuv, uyw, vzw. Such a set of four blocks is known as a quadrilateral or Pasch
configuration. However, it is possible to construct Steiner triple systems that do not contain
any Pasch configurations. These designs are termed anti-Pasch Steiner triple systems. An
anti-Pasch Steiner triple system exists for any order m ≡ 1, 3 (mod 6), m 6= 7, 13 (see [7]).
In an anti-Pasch Steiner triple system, the union of two blocks contain at most six
points, and the union of four blocks contain at least seven points. Therefore, the expanded
scheme is a (2, 4, n)-ramp scheme. So we have weakened the desired threshold property in
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the expanded scheme, but we still might get something interesting if we can identify a small
repairing set. In fact, infinite classes of resolvable anti-Pasch Steiner triple systems are
known. For example, in [4], it is shown that a resolvable anti-Pasch Steiner triple system of
order m exists for any positive integer m ≡ 9 mod 18. We can use any two parallel classes
of the design as a basic repairing set, as we did in Theorem 5.1.
5.2 BIBDs with λ = 1
Using the blocks of an (m, 4, 1)-BIBD as a distribution design would yield a scheme with
repair degree d = 4. We have the following result.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose m ≡ 4 (mod 12), Q is a prime power such that Q ≥ m + 1 and
m/2 ≤ n ≤ m(m − 1)/12. Then there exists a (2, n, 4)-RTS with restricted repairability,
with shares from (FQ)
4, having information rate 3/4 and communication complexity 4/3.
Proof. If m ≡ 4 (mod 12), then there is a resolvable (m, 4, 1)-BIBD. The union of any
two blocks in a (m, 4, 1)-BIBD contains at least seven points, and each block contains four
points. Hence we can take k = 2, ℓ1 = 4 and ℓ2 = 7, and use a (4, 7,m)-ramp scheme as
the base scheme. The expanded scheme will be a (2, n, 4)-RTS having information rate 3/4
and repair degree 4. The communication complexity is 4/3.
Two parallel classes in the BIBD comprise a basic repairing set of size m/2. As a result,
we can accommodate any value of n such that m/2 ≤ n ≤ m(m− 1)/12.
As mentioned before, the enrollment protocol with threshold k = 2 has communication
complexity equal to 4, so the communication complexity is lowered quite considerably in
Theorem 5.2.
Using the same idea, we can use other known classes of resolvable (m,d, 1)-BIBDs to
construct repairable threshold schemes. When d increases, the threshold may also increase.
We illustrate by stating results for the cases d = 5 and d = 8. The proofs are similar to
Theorem 5.1 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose m ≡ 5 (mod 20) and there exists a resolvable (m, 5, 1)-BIBD. Let
Q be a prime power such that Q ≥ m+1 and 2m/5 ≤ n ≤ m(m−1)/20. Then the following
RTS exist:
1. A (2, n, 5)-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from (FQ)
5, having informa-
tion rate 4/5 and communication complexity 5/4.
2. A (3, n, 5)-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from (FQ)
5, having informa-
tion rate 2/5 and communication complexity 5/2.
Proof. The verifications are straightforward. We note that the union of two blocks in the
BIBD contains either nine or ten points, and the union of three blocks in the design contains
at least 12 points. So we can take ℓ1 = 5 and ℓ2 = 9 when k = 2, and ℓ1 = 10 and ℓ2 = 12
when k = 3.
The first few values of m for which Theorem 5.3 can be applied are m = 25, 65 and
85. Actually, resolvable (m, 5, 1)-BIBDs are known to exist for all m ≡ 5 mod 20 except
m = 45, 345, 465, 645 (see [1]).
We state the following similar result without proof.
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Theorem 5.4. Suppose m ≡ 8 (mod 56) and there exists a resolvable (m, 8, 1)-BIBD. Let
Q be a prime power such that Q ≥ m+1 and m/4 ≤ n ≤ m(m− 1)/56. Then the following
RTS exist:
1. A (2, n, 8)-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from (FQ)
5, having informa-
tion rate 7/8 and communication complexity 8/7.
2. A (3, n, 8)-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from (FQ)
5, having informa-
tion rate 5/8 and communication complexity 8/5.
3. A (4, n, 8)-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from (FQ)
5, having informa-
tion rate 1/4 and communication complexity 4.
The first few values of m for which Theorem 5.4 can be applied are m = 64 and
120. Another known result is that resolvable (m, 8, 1)-BIBDs exist for all m ≡ 8 mod 56,
m > 24480 (see [1]).
5.3 Projective Planes
Finally, we examine the possibility of using finite projective planes as distribution designs.
A projective plane of order q is a design consisting of m = q2 + q + 1 points and q2 + q + 1
blocks (or lines), where each block contains exactly d = q+1 points and every pair of points
occurs in exactly one block. It follows that every point occurs in exactly q + 1 blocks and
any pair of blocks intersect in exactly one point.
For basic results on projective planes, see [13]. It is well-known that a projective plane
of order q exists whenever q is a prime or prime power. In this case, we can let the one-
dimensional subspaces of (Fq)
3 be points and define the two-dimensional subspaces of (Fq)
3
to be blocks. The result is a projective plane of order q known as PG(2, q).
We will use a certain subset of the blocks of the projective plane as our distribution
design. The permissible values of n will be determined by the repairability requirement.
First, we consider the minimum and maximum number of points spanned by a set of j
blocks. These values will determine the parameters of the base scheme.
Lemma 5.5. The union of any j − 1 blocks in a projective plane of order q contains at
most q(j − 1) + 1 points.
Proof. Denote the j − 1 blocks by A0, . . . , Aj−2. Each Ai (i ≥ 1) contains a point in A0, so
∣∣∣∣∣
j−2⋃
i=0
Ai
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ q + 1 + (j − 2)q = q(j − 1) + 1.
Lemma 5.6. For j ≤ q + 1, the union of any j blocks in a projective plane of order q
contains at least j(q + 1− (j − 1)/2) points.
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Table 2: (n, k, d)-RTS based on projective planes
q d k ℓ1 ℓ2 n ρ
3 4 2 4 7 9 ≤ n ≤ 13 3/4
3 7 9 1/2
4 5 2 5 9 12 ≤ n ≤ 21 4/5
3 9 12 3/5
4 13 14 1/5
5 6 2 6 11 15 ≤ n ≤ 31 5/6
3 11 15 2/3
4 16 18 1/3
q = order of projective plane
d = repairing degree
k = threshold
n = number of players
ℓ1, ℓ2 are ramp scheme thresholds
ρ = information rate of the scheme
Proof. Denote the j blocks by A0, . . . , Aj−1. Each Ai (for 1 ≤ i ≤ q) contains q + 1 − i
points that are not in ∪i−1h=0Ah. It follows that
∣∣∣∣∣
j−1⋃
i=0
Ai
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
j−1∑
i=0
(q + 1− i) = j(q + 1)− j(j − 1)
2
.
For repairability, we determine the existence of some good basic repairing sets. In
general, a basic repairing set of size s is equivalent to the dual of a 2-blocking set on s
points. Blocking sets in projective planes have been studied by several authors and various
bounds on the minimum size of a blocking set are known (see, e.g., Ball and Blokhuis [2]).
One simple (and well-known) construction is to choose any three noncollinear points x, y
and z of the projective plane, and take all the blocks that contain at least one of these
points. This yields a basic repairing set of size 3q.
Here is a well-known construction that sometimes yields basic repairing sets of size
s < 3q. Suppose that q is a square of a prime power. Start with two disjoint Baer subplanes
in PG(2, q) and take all the blocks that contain a line from either of these two subplanes.
There are 2(q+
√
q+1) such blocks, and every point in PG(2, q) is contained in at least two
of these blocks. So we have a basic repairing set of size 2(q +
√
q + 1) in this case, which is
an improvement asymptotically over the previous construction. (However, q = 9 is the first
value that actually yields a smaller basic repairing set than the “simple” construction.)
Table 2 contains some examples of repairable threshold schemes using projective planes
as distribution designs. We consider various values of q and k. The values of ℓ1 and ℓ2 are
obtained from Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6. For every n such that s ≤ n ≤ m = q2 + q+1, there is
a (k, n, q + 1)-RTS having information rate ρ and communication complexity 1/ρ.
6 Comparison with the GLF Scheme
We are able to obtain substantially improved information rates as compared with the GLF
scheme from [8]. They prove an upper bound on the information rate of the schemes
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they construct that have optimal repairing rate. Optimal repairing rate means that the
information received by the user whose share is being repaired has the same size as a share.
Our combinatorial schemes also have this feature, so a direct comparison is relevant. The
bound obtained in [8] has the form
ρ ≤ k(2d − k + 1)
2dt
, (7)
where t is given by the formula
t =
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d − i)β}. (8)
In (8), α denotes the number of elements of FQ in a share, and each user sends β elements
of FQ to a user whose node is being repaired. Therefore, in our scheme, we have α = d,
β = 1, and hence, from (8), we have
t =
k−1∑
i=0
(d− i) = kd− k(k − 1)
2
. (9)
Substituting (9) into (7), we obtain
ρ ≤ k(2d − k + 1)
2d
(
kd− k(k−1)2
) = 2d− k + 1
2d
(
d− (k−1)2
) . (10)
We illustrate with a couple of examples.
Example 6.1. Suppose k = 2, d = 3. Then (10) results in ρ ≤ 1/3. On the other hand,
we are able to achieve ρ = 2/3 for certain values of n.
Example 6.2. Suppose k = 3, d = 4. Then (10) results in ρ ≤ 1/4. However, we are able
to achieve ρ = 3/4 in certain situations.
We can also compare the communication complexity of our schemes to the GLF scheme
[8]. It is easy to see that the GLF scheme always has communication complexity that is
at least d. On the other hand, our schemes, as presented in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, always
have communication complexity that is at most d. (Of course, we also require a suitable
distribution design to exist in order to apply our results.)
7 Universal Repairability
In this section, we consider possible ways to achieve universal repairability in the combina-
torial setting we have introduced.
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7.1 Dual Hypergraph of a Complete Graph
The first examples of distribution designs for universal repairability that we consider allow
various thresholds, but the number of players is constrained. The distribution designs are
just the dual hypergraphs of complete graphs. For a positive integer n, let Kn denote the
complete graph on n vertices. The points of our distribution design will be the
(
n
2
)
edges of
Kn. For each vertex x of Kn, we define a block Bx = {e : x ∈ e}. Thus there are n blocks
in the design, each of size n − 1. Any two blocks intersect in exactly one point, and every
point occurs in exactly two blocks. The following lemma is proved by a simple counting
argument.
Lemma 7.1. Suppose 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The union of any j blocks in the above-described design
has cardinality j(n − 1)− (j2).
From Lemma 7.1, for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, it follows that the design is a (k, ℓ1, ℓ2)-distribution
design on
(
n
2
)
points, where
ℓ1 = (k − 1)(n − 1)−
(
k − 1
2
)
and
ℓ2 = k(n − 1)−
(
k
2
)
.
The design itself constitutes a basic repairing set since every point occurs in exactly two
blocks.
We have the following corollary of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 7.2. Suppose that n ≥ 3 and 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Denote m = (n2) and suppose that
Q ≥ m+1. Then, there is a (k, n, n−1)-RTS with universal repairability, having information
rate (n − k)/(n − 1) and communication complexity (n − 1)/(n − k), where every share is
an element of (FQ)
n−1.
Proof. The only observation we need to make is that universal repairability and restricted
repairability are equivalent when d = n− 1, since there is only one possible set of d players
to consider when repairing a given share.
7.2 Universal Repairability and 1-designs
Suppose the distribution design is a (v, b, r, d)-1-design. This means that we have v points,
each of which occurs in r blocks, and b blocks in total, each of which contains d points. We
are going to focus on the repairability property in this section; we do not concern ourselves
with the specific thresholds that can be achieved.
Theorem 7.3. A (v, b, r, d)-1-design provides universal repairability if and only if b < r+d.
Proof. Suppose we have a (v, b, r, d)-1-design in which b ≥ r+ d. Suppose B is a block that
we want to repair. Let x ∈ B. There are r blocks that contain x, one of which is B. Choose
any d blocks that do not contain x (this can be done because b − r ≥ d). Then these d
blocks cannot repair the block B, since none of these blocks contain x.
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Conversely, suppose have a (v, b, r, d)-1-design in which b < r+ d. Let B be a block and
let B1, . . . Bd be any other d blocks. Then every point x ∈ B is contained in at least one of
these d blocks. Thus,
B ⊆
d⋃
i=1
Bi.
It follows that the d given blocks are sufficient to repair B (we do not require that each
block contributes one subshare, so it is sufficient that B is covered by the union of the d
blocks).
The dual hypergraph of the complete graph Kn (as considered in the previous section)
is an (
(
n
2
)
, n, 2, n − 1)-1-design. Since n < 2 + (n − 1), the universal repairability property
also follows from Theorem 7.3.
Another class of designs that provide universal repairability are the complements of
Hadamard designs. These are (4t+3, 2t+2, t+2)-BIBDs and they exist for all t such that
a Hadamard matrix of order 4t + 4 exists. We just need to observe that such a BIBD is
a (4t + 3, 4t + 3, 2t + 2, 2t + 2)-1-design. Since 4t + 3 < (2t + 2) + (2t + 2), Theorem 7.3
guarantees that the repairability property holds.
8 Summary and Conclusion
We have presented two methods for repairing secrets in threshold schemes. The first method
is a simple modification of the enrollment protocol and the second method is based on using a
suitable combinatorial design to distribute “subshares” of a threshold or ramp scheme. Our
schemes provide improved information rates and/or communication complexity as compared
to previously known schemes.
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